ABSTRACT Digital signal processing (DSP) kernel-based intellectual property (IP) core forms an integral ingredient of consumer electronics devices. Thus, protection of these IP cores against reverse engineering attack is crucial. Functional obfuscation serves as a powerful mechanism to counter this hardware threat. However, functional obfuscation methodologies for DSP cores use security logics that are not lightweight and are prone to removal attack by an adversary. This paper presents a novel security mechanism for protecting functionally obfuscated DSP core against removal attack using low-cost, low-power key encryption hardware. The proposed methodology using lightweight secure hashing algorithm (SHA-512)-based key encryption custom hardware reconfigures the key-bits (resulting into structural reconfiguration) of the locking logic in a functionally obfuscated DSP design augmented with the complete logic synthesis of the design. This hinders the detection of the locking logic in the obfuscated design due to camouflaging. The proposed mechanism integrated with the functional obfuscation framework yielded lower power, lower gate count, and enhanced security compared with an existing approach. An average reduction of 25.86 % in gate count and power as well as the average enhancement of 43.75 % in security against removal attack was obtained in the proposed approach compared with a recent existing approach.
I. INTRODUCTION
Reusable IP cores such as application specific processor core, an audio processor, or a computing interface form an integral part of consumer electronics hardware [1] . Most of the System-on-Chips used in CE systems rely on these reusable IP cores for successful functioning as well as design productivity. Thus, these IP cores form an integral component of modern CE systems. However, IP cores are vulnerable to attacks such as reverse engineering [15] , Trojan insertion etc. To protect IP cores from aforementioned threats several techniques have been implemented such as IP metering, digital watermarking, Trojan detection, functional and structural obfuscation [2] - [9] , [11] , [18] etc. RE attacks can be realized through key-sensitization based attacks and removal attacks [14] , [16] , [20] . Though defense mechanisms against these attacks for DSP based IP cores have been proposed recently, however in the context of removal attack they are either not lightweight or do not provide enough security. Further, these approaches incur large gate count and power consumption during generating functionally obfuscated DSP core designs.
The proposed approach addresses these drawbacks by proposing a novel security mechanism for protecting functionally obfuscated DSP core against removal attack using low cost, low power key encryption hardware. Results on standard DSP benchmarks have validated our objective.
The novelties of this paper are as follows:
• Proposes a novel functional obfuscation methodology for DSP based IP core that is resilient against removal and key-sensitization attacks. The DSP cores verified are obtained from UCSB Express Standard suite [19] ).
• The presented functional obfuscation methodology integrates a SHA-512 based key encryption custom hardware, responsible for protecting the locking logic of the DSP core netlist against removal attacks.
• The functional obfuscation methodology incorporates two units viz. SHA-512 based key encryption custom hardware, IP core locking block key selection hardware that together enhances the security of the obfuscated design.
• The proposed functional obfuscation methodology with the SHA 512 based key encryption custom hardware incurs lower gate count, lower power and improves security compared to [10] . The paper is organised as follows: Section I discusses the introduction, Section II presents related work. Section III provides an overview of proposed methodology while Section IV presents the details of proposed methodology. Section V presents the results and section VI concludes the paper.
II. RELATED WORKS A. COMPARISON WITH PRIOR WORKS
This section mainly discusses the works on functional obfuscation of DSP cores. However, some advances on functional obfuscation of combinational circuits are also highlighted. Little literature is available on functional obfuscation of DSP cores such as [10] , [12] , and [13] . Approaches [10] , [13] have proposed functional obfuscation of DSP cores using IP core locking blocks (ILBs) and Advanced Encryption Standard (AES). These works are somewhat capable to defend against key-sensitization attack and removal attack, but at the expense of huge power/cost overhead. Further, AES hardware does not allow concurrent reconfiguration (key-bit encryption) of several ILBs at the same time due to limited size. More explicitly, for large complex DSP designs, the maximum number of ILBs possible for reconfiguration using AES hardware is only sixteen (due to 8 key-bit locking used in an ILB). Thus, for more concurrent encryption as required for DSP cores, several instances of AES are required resulting into design and power overhead. Further, [12] proposes a functional obfuscation methodology that is only capable to defend against key-sensitization attack. Thus, this approach is not capable to defend against removal attack. Further, authors do not provide any technique for power and gate count minimization in their work. On the contrary, proposed SHA-512 based key encryption hardware used in an obfuscated DSP design is capable to defend against removal attack completely as well as other attacks such as key-sensitization, as opposed to [12] that is only capable to defend against key sensitization attack. Further, proposed SHA-512 based key encryption hardware is more robust against removal attack, key sensitization attack and is able to provide concurrent encryption of innumerable ILBs (resulting into enhanced security) in an obfuscated design compared to [10] and [13] . Besides, Besides, SHA-512 based key encryption hardware utilizes lesser number of gates /lower power compared to AES hardware used in [10] and [13] during functional obfuscation.
Some other works that target functional obfuscation of combinational circuits such as [14] and [24] . References [14] and [24] have used XOR/XNOR based logic locking to enhance the security of the design. These approaches are able to defend against key sensitization and removal attacks, however do not work on complex DSP cores (unlike proposed approach). Further, [14] and [24] do not consider any optimization mechanism to reduce power or area overhead of locking design comprising of logic locking cells (XOR/XNOR gate), thus resulting in high power and area overhead. All these aforesaid limitations do not exist in the proposed approach, as it is low power and applicable on obfuscated DSP cores.
B. ADVANTAGES OF PROPOSED SHA-512 BASED KEY ENCRYPTION HARDWARE COMPARED TO AES HARDWARE USED IN OBFUSCATED DSP CORE DESIGN
• Some of the advantageous features of proposed 'SHA-512 based key encryption hardware' than AES hardware are collision resistance (hard to find two inputs that hash to the same output), uniformity (every hash value in the output range should be generated with roughly the same probability), one-way random function, deterministic (meaning that for a given input value it must always generate the same hash value) and 512-bit unique hash digest for each input as every bit of the hash code is the function of every bit of input. These properties of hash code impede attacker to guess correct input pattern from output bits.
• AES hardware used in an obfuscated design of DSP core [10] depend upon fixed secret key for producing the encrypted output used for ILB reconfiguration. The dependency on fixed secret key results into vulnerability against standard side channel attacks applied upon cryptosystems. This could compromise the secret key chosen by the designer. On the other hand, the proposed 'SHA-512 based key encryption logic' does not have any reliance on fixed secret key, thus eliminating possibility of launching side channel attack.
• AES hardware used in an obfuscated DSP design, is capable of encrypting maximum 16 ILBs (as 128-bit AES output is fed on to 16 ILBs of 8 key bits each) [10] . Thus, for large designs comprising of several ILBs (in the range of hundreds), concurrent encryption of more than 16 ILBs is not possible. Thus, requires more than one instance of AES in the design to execute concurrently. This results in to huge design and power overhead. On the other hand, the proposed 'SHA-512 based key encryption logic' is capable of encrypting maximum 64 ILBs (due to 512-bit hashed output) in single execution. This results into lower design and power overhead than AES.
• AES hardware used in an obfuscated DSP design [10] Given a control data flow graph (CDFG), module library, hashing inputs, design a light weight, low-power, functionally obfuscated IP core that is resilient against removal attack.
B. THREAT MODEL
An obfuscated DSP core can be secured against removal attacks using proposed approach, by enhancing the complexity of reverse engineering through SHA-512 based key encryption logic. Thus, generated IP core is protected from an adversary present anywhere in the untrustworthy design regime (between post-netlist creation and pre-manufacturing stage).
C. OBFUSCATION OF DSP CORE WITH ILBs 1) OVERVIEW OF ILBs
The ILBs are used in the obfuscation of DSP cores [10] . ILBs enable robust functional locking in a DSP core gate level design. In order to achieve that, ILBs comprising of hybrid combination of various AND, NAND, NOT, XOR, XNOR gates are inserted after each output bit of each functional unit. Robust security properties of ILBs and their insertion techniques are discussed as follows:
2) PROPERTIES OF ILBs USED ON OBFUSCATION
Several features of ILBs in terms of security are discussed as follows:
• Multi-pairwise security: Two key bits are said to be pairwise secure if one key bit cannot be sensitized to output without controlling the value of another key and vice-versa. ILBs used in proposed methodology, are multi-pair wise secure because any single key cannot be sensitized to output unless remaining seven keys are applied. For example, sensitization of any key Ky_n would require controlling the remaining seven keys concurrently. This security feature of ILBs protects design against key sensitization based attacks handling following attack scenarios: Key-sensitization attack based on (a) isolated key-bits (b) run of key-gates (c) mutable key-gates.
• Prohibiting key gate isolation: Key gates of ILBs used in proposed methodology are not isolated because keys gates are connected such that one gate depend on key i/ps of other gates. Thus, prohibition of key gate isolation hinders the attempt of key sensitization attack based on isolated key bits.
• Ensuring protection against run of key-gates: The keys gates of the ILBs used in proposed methodology are intertwined such that run of key gates cannot be replaced with single key gate by an attacker. This also hinders key sensitization based attack.
• Non-mutable key gates: The keys gates of the ILBs are connected in a composite fashion such that mutability of key gates is not possible without controlling all the key bits. Thus, this feature protects against key sensitization attack based on mutable key gates.
• Thwarting against IP piracy attacks and Trojan insertion attacks [21] - [23] : in order to launch these attacks, an attacker would need to identify the correct key sequence. Further, in order to insert Trojan logic in an appropriate location, an attacker needs to know the complete functionality of the design. The ILBs integrated with the proposed approach ensures to increase the attacker's effort in understanding the functionality through unlocking the key bits. This is because ILBs are distributed throughout the design in large number and every ILB requires a valid key sequence to actuate it.
3) INSERTION TECHNIQUES FOR ILBs
ILB insertion is made at the output data bit of each functional unit. The ILBs not generated through reconfiguration (using output of key encryption logic), are inserted in the gate level DSP design using a repetition pattern of its same structure. This repetition pattern is achieved through a random variable µ that is given as 1 ≤ µ ≤ T ILB ; T ILB symbolizes a designer selected repetition patterns of ILBs for insertion [10] .
D. OVERVIEW OF PROPOSED SECURITY METHODOLOGY AGAINST REMOVAL ATTACK
Diagrammatic representation of the overview of proposed methodology is shown in Fig.1 . In the proposed methodology, 'SHA-512 based key encryption custom hardware' generates encrypted keys for reconfiguring (restructuring) ILB structure (locking blocks) in a functionally obfuscated DSP design. This provides the initial hindrance to an attacker in detecting any standard ILB gate architecture in the obfuscated design netlist, thus thwarting removal attack. In proposed SHA-512 based key encryption custom hardware, a designer selected input of m-bits is fed, where these input bits are encrypted into multiples of N bits, through proposed approach, where N varies from 1 to 64. These N * 8 bits are the encrypted keys for the 'N' different ILBs. Based on these encrypted key-bits, the ILB gate structure is reconfigured (re-structured). Since, in proposed work, one ILB requires 8 keys; up to 64 ILBs can be encrypted at the same time using proposed methodology. ILB y , ILB y+1 , . . . , ILB y+63 , shown in Fig. 1 , represents those ILBs whose keys are encrypted through the 'key encryption hardware', while for the remaining ILBs of obfuscated design, keys are left non-encrypted. Thus, proposed SHA-512 based key encryption hardware provides robust encryption to the keys of ILBs of a functionally obfuscated DSP design, resulting into structural reconfiguration of several ILBS concurrently. These reconfigured ILBs along with the obfuscated design are fully synthesized in a logic synthesis tool. This results into non-identification of ILB gate architectures due to camouflaging, thereby thwarting removal attack on ILBs and key encryption hardware itself.
FIGURE 1.
Overview of encrypted keys generated for ILB reconfiguration using SHA-512 based key encryption hardware. 
E. SECURITY PROPERTIES OF PROPOSED METHODOLOGY AGAINST REMOVAL ATTACK IN FUNCTIONALLY OBFUSCATED DSP CORE
The proposed 'custom hardware of SHA-512 based key encryption logic' is capable to safeguard against removal attacks on ILBs (used for functional obfuscation) and SHA-512 based key encryption hardware itself. In SHA-512, secure hashing is a one-way function that is able to produce a unique digest of the input information. A designer performs the following steps to protect against removal attacks: firstly, the custom hardware of SHA-512 based key encryption logic (responsible for the key encryption of the ILBs) is fully synthesized for a designer chosen m-bit input. The output of the key encryption hardware is connected to the sub-set of the functional obfuscation logic (ILBs) in the obfuscated netlist, depending upon the number of ILBs selected (N) for encryption by the designer. Key encryption logic block is capable of producing N * 8 bit encrypted output corresponding to the designer selected m-bits. Depending upon the value of N, the desired number of ILBs is encrypted (structurally reconfigured). For example, in proposed key encryption logic block maximum N = 64 ILBs can be encrypted. Depending upon the 8-bit value yielded, the specific ILB is reconfigured by reorganizing the internal gate structure. SHA-512 key encryption hardware allows larger number of key input encryption of ILBs resulting into larger number of ILB architecture reconfiguration simultaneously (resulting into more camouflaging from an attackers perspective). This hinders an attacker in detecting any standard ILB architecture in the obfuscated design netlist, thus thwarting removal attack. Further, the complete synthesis of the custom hardware of SHA-512 based key encryption logic along with the obfuscated design makes the individual components indistinguishable post synthesis. Thus, any attempt to remove ILB/SHA-512 block is preliminary thwarted. Furthermore, the proposed hardware of 'SHA-512 based key encryption logic' is a custom architecture of two sub-architectures, which are not known to the attacker. Most importantly, the ILBs structures are not known before but is created based on the 'key encryption logic' output that in-turn depends on the secret m-bit input and custom ILB keys selection logic. This thwarts the attacker from identifying the reconfigured ILB structures, as he/she unaware of the hashed output and custom key encryption logic. Additionally as the custom hardware of SHA-512 based key encryption logic, ILBs and obfuscated design, post synthesis (post technology mapping and optimization) completely changes, thus distinguishing individual components in a complex DSP core netlist is extremely challenging. Finally, the proposed obfuscated netlist comprises of basic gates which post synthesis converts into technology specific implementations, which makes it even harder for an attacker to identify the components for launching complete removal attack.
IV. CUSTOM HARDWARE DESIGN OF PROPOSED METHODOLOGY A. OVERVIEW OF PROPOSED KEY ENCRYPTION HARDWARE
Proposed lightweight 'SHA-512 based key encryption hardware block' diagram comprises of 'SHA-512 custom hardware', and 'ILB keys selection logic hardware', as shown in Fig. 2 . Primary inputs to proposed key encryption hardware block are m-bits input and initial hash buffers values. The process of choosing the m-bits is explained in next sub-section. The initial values of hash buffers of SHA-512:
Since, the size of each hash buffer is 64 bits, total 512 bits are fed to hash buffer feed logic. The SHA-512 based key encryption hardware for ILB reconfiguration logic is fed with m-bits primary input which is first converted into a block of 1024 bit (explained in next sub-section). Subsequently for each round, using key encryption hardware and ILB keys selection logic, this block of 1024 bits is processed with hash buffer values. After the designer specified last round, ILB keys selection logic selects the keys for the designer selected 'N'ILBs of functionally obfuscated design, from the 512 bits of hash buffer values. The hardware for ILB keys selection functionality is custom designed. This feature hinders an adversary from performing removal attack (of locking logic) as the 'N' ILB structures are reconfigured based on the output of proposed key encryption hardware. Next sub-section describes the SHA-512 based key encryption hardware.
1) DESIGN OF CUSTOM HARDWARE OF SHA-512 BASED KEY ENCRYPTION LOGIC
Details of the design of proposed custom hardware of SHA-512 based key encryption logic shown in Fig. 3 . Proposed block enhances the security by providing encryption to larger number of ILB key-bits concurrently in a functionally obfuscated design as well as incurs lower gate count making it light-weight solution for defending against removal attacks. Five major steps of SHA-512 hardware are: (a) appending input (b) word extraction (c) constant extraction, (d) hash buffer processing and (e) round function computation (RFC). As shown in Fig. 3 , primary input of SHA-512 block is m-bits. During the 'appending input' step, m-bits of primary input are transformed into a block of 1024 bit by padding and appending some extra bits. The length of m-bits varies from 1 to 896. If length is less than 896, then these input bits are first converted to a block of size 896 bits by padding '1' followed by '0' bits and then block of 896 bits is further transformed into a block of 1024 bit by appending 128-bit representation of input data length. After that, the output of first step (1024 bits) is passed to next step (word extraction step). During the word extraction step, for each round, one word of 64 bits (Wt) is extracted from 1024 bits generated from first step and word computation logic. Functionality of word computation logic is similar to that of standard SHA. During the constant extraction step, for each round, one constant of 64 bits (Kt)is extracted from 16 constants (k0,k1, . . . , k15) stored in 64 bits registers. Values of constants are same as used in standard SHA. Hash buffer processing step provides the hash buffer values, for each round, to the last step i.e. RFC. For each round, one word from 'word extraction' step and one constant from 'constant extraction' step are also fed to RFC step. Block diagram of custom hardware representation of RFC step is shown in Fig. 4. Eight input buffers a, b,  c, d , e, f, g and h, each of 64bits, contain the hash buffer values provided by hash buffer processing step. Six major functions of RFC are as follows: (a) summation/ rotation 'a' (b) majority function (c) summation/ rotation 'e' (d) choose function (e) mix function T1 (f) mix function T2. Fig. 4 shows the hardware mapping of these six functions. Internal hardware structure of each function of RFC step is evident from Fig. 4 . Rotation function hardware of a 64-bitbuffer value is shown in Fig. 5 which explains for example a circular right shift of 'a' by 28 bits. Here, Fig. 4 clearly exhibits the processing of RFC block to generate new hash buffer values, which are denoted as at, bt, ct, dt, et, ft, gt and ht (where t indicates round #'t'). However, the number of rounds for which RFC block computes is custom specified. Final output of RFC block (512 bits) is stored in hash buffers as new hash buffer values which are further fed to ILB key selection logic. Further, ILB key selection logic selects the N * 8 bits as key-bits for 'N' ILBs of functionally obfuscated design, based on which the 'N' ILB structure are reconfigured (generated). Thus, proposed key encryption logic provides reconfiguration of upto 64 ILBs in a functionally obfuscated DSP design.
2) DEMONSTRATION OF ILB STRUCTURE RECONFIGURATION THROUGH PROPOSED KEY ENCRYPTION HARDWARE
This sub-section demonstrates the encryption process of the keys of ILB resulting into ILB structure reconfiguration. According to these encrypted keys, ILBs of functionally obfuscated DSP design are reconfigured. The output of the key encryption logic (encrypted N * 8 bits)can be fed to the keys of upto 'N'ILBs in the locked structure (eight keys exists in an ILB in an obfuscated design). For example, a 8-bit primary input (61 H) is fed to the proposed key encryption logic block, which generates 512 bits hash digest. Further, on designer specific select values, ILB keys selection logic selects multiple of 8 bits keys out of 512 bits, depending on the number of ILBs being fed (or intended for structural reconfiguration). To feed the keys of 'N' ILBs, N * 8 bits are chosen by the designer. For demonstration, a single ILB structure obtained post-reconfiguration is shown in Fig. 6 . This is generated based on the 8 bits key values (B0 hex = 1011 0000 2 ) obtained from ILB key selection logic block, on applying designer specific control value. Thus 'N' number of ILBs can be reconfigured accordingly by reorganizing the ILB internal gates (hybrid combination of various AND, NAND, NOT, XOR, XNOR gates) in an appropriate fashion.
B. IMPLEMENTATION OF PROPOSED SECURE HASHING BLOCK AND INTEGRATING WITH OBFUSCATED DESIGN FOR A SAMPLE APPLICATION-FIR FILTER
Proposed implementation of secure hashing block is shown in Fig. 7 . Post-implementation, the block is integrated with the locking logic i.e. obfuscated design. Proposed methodology has been demonstrated for a sample application-finite impulse response (FIR) filter. Gate level structure of fir filter with design constraints of one adder and one multiplier and each input size of 4 bits, is functionally obfuscated by inserting one ILB in each output bit of each functional unit. As an example, we inserted only 8 ILBs to functionally obfuscate the fir design. In order to make this functionally obfuscated fir filter, more robust and secured, proposed 'custom hardware of sha-512 based key encryption logic block' is integrated to this obfuscated design. in the implementation, as an example, reconfiguration of a single ILB of an obfuscated fir filter is performed using the encrypted output bits of key encryption logic block (shown in fig. 8 ). This complete design is synthesized and functionally verified in Intel Quartus II v13.0 for cyclone-II: EP2C70F896C6 FPGA. Synthesis result reports significant improvement over [10] , in terms of logic elements and dedicated logic registers as shown in table 1. 
V. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
The baseline design, proposed approach and related work [10] all are implemented in java and run on AMD A8-4500M APU with 4 GB DDR3 memory at 1.9 GHz. 15nm technology scale based on NANGATE is used to evaluate the area and latency of an obfuscated design [17]. Proposed methodology renders functionally obfuscated DSP cores more robust and highly secure against removal attack. Furthermore, proposed methodology also hinders key sensitization based attack through ILB blocks embedded in the obfuscated DSP design. Further compared to [10] , side-channel attack is not possible as there is no secret key TABLE 2. Comparisons of key-bits encrypted in Obfuscated design of proposed approach and [10] and increase in security obtained in proposed approach.
FIGURE 9.
Minimal delay overhead due to insertion of ILBs.
in the crypto block used. Finally, proposed key encryption hardware is a light weight and low power solution than [10] . Calculations of gate count, power and delay are based on 15 nm NanGate library [17] . Security strength, gate count and power of proposed methodology have been compared with [10] . Moreover, this section also reports gate count and power overhead of proposed work and [10] with respect to baseline (non-secured design). Delay overhead due to ILBs is also reported in last sub-section. Following subsections present the aforesaid results and analysis.
A. SECURITY (STRENGTH OF OBFUSCATION) ANALYSIS OF THE PROPOSED APPROACH
Security (strength of obfuscation) of the proposed approach has been compared with [10] in terms of the number of encrypted keys (resulting into number of ILBs reconfigured) in a functionally obfuscated design. Security comparison is made for same number of locking key-bits in a functionally obfuscated DSP cores for both proposed and [10] . As observed from Table 2 , more number of key bits in a functionally obfuscated design can be encrypted(resulting into larger number of ILB structure reconfiguration) using proposed approach compared to [10] , for the same number of locking key-bits. As the output of key encryption logic block is 512-bithash digest, therefore upto 512 keys bits can be encrypted using proposed approach, whereas output of one AES block used in [10] is 128 bits, therefore it can encrypt maximum 128 key bits. Even, two AES blocks [10] can encrypt up to 256 key bits only as implemented for IIR, Mesa Horner, DWT, ARF, FIR in Table 2 , which is still 50% less secured than proposed key encryption logic block. For larger DSP designs such as JPEG IDCT, Mesa Interpolate etc., there is large number of encoded key bits (greater than 3000 as shown refer Table 2 ). For such designs, three AES blocks concurrently can provide encryption to 384 key bits only whereas proposed one ' SHA-512 based key encryption logic block' can provide encryption to 512 key bits of ILBs. Thus, this shows increment in security by 25% for larger size DSP cores. Average enhancement of 43.75% in security is achieved using proposed approach than [10] .
B. OVERHEAD ANALYSIS OF PROPOSED APPROACH AND [10] W.R.T BASELINE IN TERMS OF GATE COUNT
Gate count of proposed approach and [10] has been compared with respect to baseline. Non-obfuscated DSP cores are termed as baseline designs. Although, integration of locking blocks and crypto block with baseline designs incur area (gate count) overhead, however, results in Table 3 show that gate count overhead of proposed approach is significantly low w.r.t [10] for the same design architecture. The reason behind the reduction in gate count is that one AES block [10] alone can provide encryption to maximum 16 locking blocks in a functionally obfuscated DSP designs whereas proposed key encryption logic is capable of providing encryption of upto maximum 64 locking blocks. Thus, more than one instance of AES block is required for concurrent reconfiguration of several ILBs. This increases the gate count overhead of [10] compared to proposed methodology wrt baseline design. For example [10] requires integrating atleast two AES blocks with functionally obfuscated FIR, DWT, MESA designs for providing reconfiguration to a substantial number of ILBs. Further, for large designs such as JPEG IDCT, Mesa Interpolate [10] would require integrating even beyond two AES blocks with functionally obfuscated design. This incurs more gate count overhead than proposed approach wrt baseline.
C. COMPARISON OF PROPOSED APPROACH AND [10] IN TERMS OF GATE COUNT AND POWER
Power of baseline design, [10] and proposed approach in micro-watt (µW) is presented in Table 4 . It is evident from Table 4 that power overhead of proposed approach w.r.t baseline design is low compared to [10] . As the gate level netlist of proposed approach comprises of less number of gates than that of [10] , thus power reduction is achieved. This is because, in order to improve security, design overhead due to AES block [10] becomes high which results in higher gate count and hence higher power consumption than proposed methodology. Table 5 presents the % reduction in the power and gate count obtained by proposed approach compared TABLE 5. Percentage reduction in gate count and power of proposed work wrt [10] .
to [10] . On average 25.86 % reduction in power/gate count is achieved compared to [10] . Thus, proposed approach is a lowpower as well as higher security solution than [10] against removal attack.
D. COMPARISON OF PROPOSED APPROACH WITH [10] WRT DESIGN COST
The proposed work has been compared with [10] in terms of design cost as shown in Table 6 . The design cost can be expressed in terms of the following equation (1):
where w1 = w2 = user specified weightage metric assigned to 0.5 each, L T = latency of the obfuscated design, P T = power of the obfuscated design, L max and P max are the maximum values of latency and power of an obfuscated design possible. As evident from Table 6 , proposed approach is capable to significantly reduce the design cost of obfuscation design netlist compared to [10] . The reduction of design cost in proposed approach is achieved due to integration of lightweight SHA-512 based key encryption hardware in contrast to heavyweight AES hardware used in [10] .
E. DELAY OVERHEAD ANALYSIS DUE TO ILBs
Delay incurred due to insertion of ILBs in a DSP core design is nominal. Delay overhead due to ILBs over non-obfuscated (baseline) DSP core designs is shown graphically in Fig. 9 .
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
This paper presented a novel functional obfuscation methodology for DSP cores using IP locking blocks and key encryption logic block (that comprised of secure hashing block, ILB key insertion logic and feed hash buffer logic) that is capable of providing enhanced security against removal attack and key-sensitization attack besides being lightweight in terms of gate count and power. The results indicated that proposed obfuscation approach is capable to provide an average reduction of 25.86 % in gate count (and power) as well as average enhancement of 43.75 % in security (obfuscation) compared to [10] . Our future work is geared towards enhancing the security feature further using other security protocols without compromising the lightweight nature of the design. 
